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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

TRILBA A. JONES, Incompetent,
by her Guardian Ad Litem,
BONNIE JEWEL SHINER,

)
)

)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)

)

vs.

)
)

SHARON COLBY KIEFER,

Case No. 18339

)
)

Defendant/Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELL.A.NT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Respondent brought action against Defendant/Appellant
seeking to have certain deeds to real property !:.cld by defendant in the
City of Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah, set aside, claiming that the
first of these deeds was procured through fraud, duress, breach
of fidicuary responsibility, and without fair and adequate
consideration.

The Plaintiff/Respondent further attacked the

second deed claiming that the Defendant/Appellant took the property
with knowledge of purported defects in the deed granting the
property to her predecessor in interest, and that the grant of the
property to Defendant/Appellant was without consideration.

-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock, Judge, on December 8, 1981.

Judgment was entered

against defendant/appellant on January 8, 1982.

A Motion for

New Trial was filed·and an Order denying relief thereunder entered on March 1, 1982.

The judgment set aside and rendered

null and void the deeds under which the defendant/appellant
claimed intterest in and held the subject property.

The Notice

of Appeal was filed on March 30, 1982.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant/appellant (hereinafter "appellafit") requests
that the judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and that
the Supreme Court order the entry of judgment finding that the
plaintiff/respondent (hereinafter "respondent") failed to meet
the burden of proof required in the case, which would have the
effect of reinstating the deeds set aside by the trial court's
judgment and vest title to the subject property in appellant.

STATEMENT OF" FACTS
Plaintiff, Trilba A. Jones, was, at the date of trial
in the within case, a 77 year old widow (T 10), her husband
having died in 197>6.

Mrs. Jones owned solely, after her

husband's death, a home on certain real estate in Nephi, Juab
County, Utah, more fully described as:
The North half of Lot 3, Block 30, Plat "B",

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An abstract of title to the said property was received into
evidence and showed, in relevant part, through a series of transactions the following:
(1)

Grant L. Jones and Plaintiff, Trilba A. Jones were

_deeded the property in question on June 8, 1970;
(2)

Trilba A. Jones granted the property to Millie Atkin

Fordham Colby, by Warranty Deed, on March 3, 1978;
(3)

Millie Colby granted the property to Sharon Colby

Kiefer, Defendant/Appellant herein, by Warranty Deed on June 30,
1980.

(Abstract of Title, Plaintiff's Exhibit - 2)
Mrs. Jones continued to live alone in the home after her

husband's death until January 31, 1978, when, while working as a
baby-sitter for neighbors she fell and fractured her leg.

(T 12)

She was hospitalized at Moutain View Hospital, Payson, Utah, from
that date for approximately two months.
Plaintiff's Exhibit - 1)
visited

(Medical Records,

While at the hospital she was frequently

by family members and friends, including her daughter,

Millie Colby.

The Deed of March 3, 1980, was executed by Mrs.

Jones while she was in the hospital.

(T 15)

Uncontested in the case was that the deeds of March 3, 1978,
and June 30, 1980, transferring ownership of the subject property,
respectively, to Millie Colby and then to Sharon Colby Kiefer were
not purchases.

It was

was, legally, a gift.

fu~ther

uncontested that the second deed

(T 88, 95)

Millie Colby did not live in the house after the date of the
deed and died on April 3, 1981.

(T71)

After releas-e from the

hospital, Mrs. Jones liv.ed in the subject home until illness forced
her to enter a rest home.

(T 22)

Mrs. Jones was transferred to a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nursing _home in Salt Lake City in late 1979.

(T 23)

Appellant

moved to the house on June 13, 1981, and lived there continuously
until trial.

(T 85)

A petition for appointment of Conservator

based on incompetency of Trilba A. Jones was filed in.the District
Court of Salt Lake County.

The conservatorship was denied.

(T 54)

No evidence was produced at the trial concerning a judicial
decision on the incompetence of Mrs. Jones--whether based on physical disability or mental incapacity.

ARGUMENT
I

THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
VALIDITY INHERENT IN A DEI;IVERED, RECORDED DEED
WITH CLEAR AND CONVINctt:NG PROOF AND THE FOLLOWING
FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The evidence established that the March 3, 1978, deed was
delivered to Millie Colby at the time of its execution and
subsequently recorded prior to the death of Mille Colby.
Abstract of Title, Plaintiff's Exhibit -

2}

(_T 15,

The evidence further

established that the deed of June 30, 1980, granting the subject
property to appellant was recorded ..
iff''s Exhibit - 2)

(Abstract of Title, Plaint-

The delivery and recordation of a deed gives

rise, under the law, to certain presumptions and establishes a
special burden of proof to be met by one trying to invalidate
the deed..

The presumption raised by the delivery of the deed

is that of transfer of interest.

In Allen.v. Allen, 115 Utah

303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949), at 461, the Court stated:

" * * *

The recording of the deed and placing
the names of others on the property is somewhat in the nature of a public declaration
that she intended the instrument to become
effective immediately. People as a rule do not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
deliberately
put aAct,flaw
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property, thereby handicapping its later disposal, unless they really intend to transfer
some interest to the person whose name is in
the record. "
The person who seeks to have a deed declared invalid must show
proof greater than that normally required in a civil case.

The

person so asserting must show the invalidity by "clear and convincing evidence."

Northcrest, :1:rnc .. v. ,. Walker Bank and Trust

Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952).
Another general principal of law applicable to this case
must be stated as a preamble to appellant's argument: this being
an action in equity, the reviewing court must make a determination of the facts.

"

*
* * th~s action to avoid deeds is
one in equity upon which this court has both
the prerogative and the duty to review and
weigh. the evidence and determine the facts."
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d!811 (_Utah 1972)
at 812.

The context of the case shifts that burden to the appellant herein,
appellant having attacked by the appeal the findings of fact made
by the trial court:
"However, in the practical application of that
rule it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged. position of the
trial court, in close proximity to the parties
and the witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of correctness of his findings and judgment,
with the burden upon the appellant to show they
were in error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings merely because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but do so only if the evidence clearly preponderates against them." id.
It is the position of the appellant that the evidence
produced at the trial clearly preponderated in the favor of the
appellant and the judgment for respondent was not supported by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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l
j

the evidence:.
The Court made specific findings as follows:
(1)

That the Incompetent did not have the requisite

mental capacity to make a valid gift of her home and real
property; or
(2)

She did not know she was making a gift;

(3)

That the Incompetent did not have the intent to

convey the property to Millie Colby as her sole and separate
property nor did she intend to make a gift of the property
to Millie Colby to the exclusion of her rights and the rights
of the other heirs;
(4)
in

That Millie Colby exercised duress on the Incompetent

procuring the deed to the subject property i
(5)

That persons who stood in fidicuary capacity to

the Incompetent and who had a duty to tell her of the deed
failed to do so;
(6)

That the transfer from Millie Colby to Defendant/

Appellant herein was without consideration.

A.
INCOMPETENCY OF TRILBA A. JONES, HFR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE DEED OF
MARCH 3, 1978, AND HER INTENT TO CONVEY
REE OWNERSHIP TO MILLIE COLBY BY GIFT
The respondent attempted to show the incompetency of Trilba
A. Jones on March 3, 1978, the date of the first deed, by introducing testimony from Mrs. Jones, herself, and from Bonnie Shiner.
Also introduced was the medical record of Mrs. Jones' stay at
Mountain
View Hospital following the accident in which she broke
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is noteworthy in discussing the evidence produced at trial
to show the incompetency of Mrs. Jones that no medical testimony
was. offered, even though the respondent had, at pre-trial confenence, given the names of physicians respondent would produce at
trial to establish her ino.ompetence.
Hearing~

7,8)

(Transcript of Pre-Trial

Listed were a Dr. Mendenhall, the physician treat-

ing Mrs. Jonesa fracture, and a Dr. MacDonald, an internist.

Fur-

ther, the very_ denomination of the parties claims the incompetence
of Mrs. Jones.

The record of evidence at trial, however, is

devoid of proof that there has been a judicial determination of
Mrs. Jones' incompetence.

Paragraph 2 of respondent's Complaint

alleges1 and was admitted by appellant, that application had been
made to the District Court of Salt Lake County for appointment of
a conservator.

But the evidence at trial was that the appointment

had been denied. (T 54, 73)

Bonnie Shiner appeared as Guardian Ad

Litem for Mbs. Jones based on an ex-parte application alleging
Mrs. Jones' incompetency"by reason of "mental deficiency, loss
of memory, physical illnes or disability and advanced age."
application is dated May 29, 1981.

The

It is endorsed by the alleged

incompetent Mrs. Jones who nominates Bonnie Shiner therein as her
guardian ad litem.
(T 10-33)

Mrs. J"ones appeared and testified at the trial.

Respondent, it appears, has taken an inconsistent pos-

tion in the trial as to the issue of Mrs. Jones' competency generally.

1

If she).:r indeed, as the Pebit±on i.for Appointment as Guardian

Ad Liteml'would indicate, was mentally: incompetent on May 29, 1981,
and suffered from loss of memory, what was her competency to
be a witness in this case on December 8, 1981?
(1953) §78-24-2 states:

Utah Code Anno.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"WHO MAY NOT BE WITNESSES.--The following persons
cannot be witnesses: (1) Those who are of unso·und
mind at the time of their production for examination. * * * 11
Reading of the evidence produced by respondent shows that respondent would have it accepted that Mrs. Jones was competent
as of December 8, 1981, when she testified at the trial since
respondent's arguments placed heavy reliance on the testimony
of Mrs. Jones as to the events of March 3, 1978,
thrust of

respondent~s

~ut

the whole

case is to attempt to show that Mrs. Jones

was incompetent while in the hospital and again within a year
th~reafter.

It is only from the allegations of paragraph 2

of the Complaint ·and the denomination of the parties, that the
incompetency of Mrs. Jones, generally, can be inferred.

While

that is not the crucial issue in the case, respondent's attempt
to infer incompetency on March 3, 1978, from the foregoing may
be questioned and, on review, falls short of such inference.
As to the specific factual issue of the case, Mrs. Jones'
competency on March 3, 1978, both parties offered evidence.
Mrs. Jones testified, in essence, that she signed the deed
at her daughter, Millie Colby's request, without explanation
from Millie Colby as to the nature of that document.

(T 15, 16)

Mrs. Jones testified that she later discovered the fact of .the
deed when she attempted to sell the house.

(T 16)

Contrary

testimony was given by Defendant/Appellant's witness, Harold
Harmer, the Administrator at Mountain View Hospital, and the
Notary Public whose signature appears on the March 3, 1982,
deed.

Mr. Harmer testified to his practice in relation to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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notarization of patients' signatures on documents while in the
hospital:
A:
It was always my practice to review the
document that they wer~ signing and ask them if
they understood thoroughly what they were signing.
And whenever I did and could I advised them that
this may or may not hold up in court. But I did
want them to know how serious the document was.
(T 75)

Mr. Harmer further testified:
(By Mr. Anderson, Defendant/Appellant's trial
attorney)
OK. Alright. Now, do you recall talking
with Trilba Jones about this deed?
Q:

A: Well, I couldn't list any specifics that I
might have told her; but I recall doing this,
everytime that I ever notorized a document of
this nat ul'!"e, that I went through i t thoroughly
with the patient to see if they understood.
(T 75 - 76)

.* * *
A: And I couldn't remember any details.
But,
no, I do not remember that she seemed confused
or did not understand.
If that had of [sic] been
the case, I would not have notorized her signature
if she had not understood what I was telling her.
(T 78)

On cross examination by Mr. Ables, Plaintiff/Respondent's
attorney, Mr. Harmer testified:

Q: Well, you review the document, anyhow, before
the person signs it?
A:
I review it with the patient.
I take, I sit
there by the bed and review it with the patient
and tell them what they are signing, that this is
a deed, that you are deeding a home, and -- (T 79)

* * *
Q:

Then you tell them also about how serious the
document is, is that, you testify to that?
A: Well, I.told them that they were deeding, that
she was deeding her home.

* * *
-9-
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,,.,,
:__~~ :::"~.:-:~::r words, was it your testimony here that
M~s. Jo~es was not confused at the time you had her

sign this deed?

A:
I don't believe that she was.
If she were, I
question that I would have gone ahead with the
notarization of her signature. (T 80)
Further evidence contrary to the testimony of Mrs.
Jones was given by Defendant/Appellant's witness, Anita
Lynn Luke, a registered nurse who witnessed the deed:
A:
I recall that Mr. Harmer asked her questions,
and she seemed to answer intelligently.
·

Q:

And you were satisfied as a witness?

A:

Yes they[sic] she knew she was signing.

(T 84)

The very denomination of the case name and the allegation of
incompetency in the Petition for Appointment as

Guardia~

Ad

Litem, stating that Mrs. Jones was mentally deficient and sufferred from loss of memory tend to impeach the evidence offered
by the respondent as to the. value _of Mrs. Jones' testimony at
trial.

Tbe

test

tb.-=.det:e.~mine,

·:.in the

conte~t

of a. deed, the

competency of the signer is set forth in Peterson v. Carter,

579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978), at 331:
"The test whether granter has sufficent mental
capacity to make a deed is: Were mental faculties
so deficient or· impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the
deed, its nature. and its probable consequences, and
to act with discretion in relation thereto, or with
relation to ordinary affairs of life?"
The evidence offered by the. respondent to, positively, prove
the

incompetency of Mrs. Jones on March 3, 1978, fails to

meet the burden of proof required.

Aside from her statements

"jutt a paper--sign it," the respondent offered only scant
reference to the medical record and the conclusory observations
of Bonnie Shiner. (T 4 5)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The testimony of Mrs. Jones at trial, if she was, indeed, competent,: is subject to question for it is, overwhelmingly, self-serving.
to the property.

If it is accepted, she would again hold title
Cross-examination disclosed more memory oS

the circumstances of

signing~

Mrs. Jones was questioned as

to the visit of a Provo attorney, Mr. Ronald Stanger, concerning
the drawing up of a deed while she was at the hospital. At first
Mrs. Jones did not recall his visit but later admitted signing
a check in payment (T 26) and the visit:

Q:

A11 right.

Do you remember him talking

to you about drawing up a deed and you paying
him this check?
A. Yes.

(T 2 7)

On redirect examination Mrs. Jones disclosed:

Q: And so it was your idea then to go ahead anc
to deed the property away to Millie?
A: Yes, but Millie's dead now.

(T 29)

Apparently not satisfied with the foregoing answer, respondent's
counsel continued:

Q: Well, that doesn't make--Was i t your idea to go
ahead and give ti to her?
A: I don't remember nothing, Wendell.
would make it.

I

knew Millie

(T 29)

Mrs. Jones then continues .·;to rely on her present lack of memory.
(T 30)

But, on recross, the followin(}:was stated:

Q: Mrs. Jones, now, Millie is dead now?
A:,,Right.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-11Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q: That's ri'ght.

Ad
·
' t · i't t rue t h at you gave
n isn

her the house and that you wanted her to have the
house, but now that she's dead you want it back; is
that right?
A: That's correct.
In Controlled Receivables , Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807,
at 810, the Court, referring in note 9 to Allen v. Allen, supra,
stated:

" * * *

this court observed that the facts were consistent with forgetfulness or misunderstanding of the
legal effect by the grantor of what she did or with a
change of mind or desire at a subsequent date, but
that they were not necessarily probative of a knowledge that she did not convey or did not intend to
convey her land at the time. "·

Appellant, too, offered evidence of the competency of Mrs ..
Jones before and after the accident:

Mrs. Jones lived alone in

the Nephi house poth before hospitalization (T 11) and after release for over a year (T 22); that she had employment as a babysitter before the accident (T 21) and could even care for a retarded child (Tl2); that after the accident she took and passed
a driver's license examination and resumed driving her car (T 22) ..
While not made a

SfJ~cific

finding, the appellant stipula-

ted at pre-trial hearing that no cash consideration was given
for the Jones to Colby deed.

But that does now exclude that

there was non-cash consideration.

The record indicates that

Millie Colby, after the hospitalization of Mrs. Jones, continued to be supportive of her and that Mrs. Jones had come to
expect that.

(T 28) In Jordan v. Jordan, 445 P.2d 765 (Utah

1968) at 766, this Court has stated: "

* * *

love and af-

f ection and the ensuing actions of parties represented good
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Further, as to the J?oint of lack on consideration for the Jones
to Colby deed, no citation to case law is required to support
the position that property may be transferred by gift alone.

B.
Ll\CK OF TRILBA JONES' INTENT TO TRANSFER
THE PROPERTY TO', THE EXCLUSION OF HER RIGHTS
AND THE RIGHTS OF HER OTHEF. HEIRS THEREIN

The :5.inding __ is made i by the Court that Mrs. Jones did not
intend, by the deed of March 3, 1978, to grant title to Millie
Colby to the exclusion of her own rights and the rights of others.
The finding, in effect, is an alternative hypothesis by the Court
and challenges the findings of Mrs. Jones' incompetency and lack
of knowledge.

That she intended to "give the property to

is supported by quotations from the transcript, supra.

Millie~::

That this

necessarily would affect her rights therein is apparant.

The

problem in analyzing the trial court's reasoning is that this
position is inconsistent with the findings previously

d~scussed.

If Mrs. Jones was incompetent or if she did not know what she
was doing, then the transfer is void.
rely on the

assumption~'

The instant finding must-

that Mrs. Jones was competent and did

know what she was doing, but that she did the act of signing the
deed for some other purpose than delivery of title.
tion is not supported by the record.
testimony.

Such a posi-

Mrs. Jones offered no such

Respondent attempted to use the testimony of Mairiam

Winn, a granddaughter of Mrs. Jones, to support some type of
informal trust arrangement but that testimony was ordered stricken
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
by theSponsored
Court.
(TLibrary
71)Services and Technology Act,-13administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Further testimony was offered trhough Mairiam Winn that
Millie Colby would deed the property back to a conservator for
Mrs. Jones.

(T 67,68)

This testimony is of no value in support-

ing the finding by the Court.

It is, if accurate, only a repre-

sentation of Millie Colby's then state of mind and not the intent
of her granter.

Further, it was based on the premise that there

would be a conservatorship--which was never completed.

(T 54,73)

It cannot be used to infer the mind of Trilba Jones on March 3,

1978.
That a deed can be construed an some way·1.1.asr Mill runs counter
to the presumption in favor of the validity and recordation of
instruments of conveyance.

Jordan v. Jordan, supra.

The Court's finding is further without support in that it
presupposes some specific intent of Mrs. Jones concerning the
house in question.

The 1965 will of Mrs. Jones was introduced

by respondent, apparantly to show a "share and share alike"
intent on the part of Mrs. Jones.

(Exhibit 7)

A "Statement

Giving Power of Attorney" dated February 23, 1978, contains
similar language but no specific mention of the house and property. Exhibit 9)

The record contains mention of other property

of Mrs. Jones in the form of bank accounts, a note receivable,
etc.

(T 41, 55)

That testamentary documents are as transitory

as the prior disp9sition of ·property make them is universally
accepted.

The testator may exclude certain property from equal

division distribution among his heirs either by making specific
bequests, gifts or devises in the will itself or by making other
disposition outside of the will which ne1jates equal distribution
of his
estate.
In Lawfact,
thefor digitization
effect
ofby transfer
byanddeed
is to keep
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
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property out of·' the estate per se.

And, that one

may change

one's mind by subsequent, contrary act is inherent in the law
of will$.

c.
THE DEED OF MARCH 3, 1978, WAS THE
PRODUCT OF DURESS EXERCISED BY MILLIE
COLBY ON TRILBA JONES
The Court found that duress was employed by Millie Colby
on Trilba Jones to obtain the March 3, 1978, deed.

The testimony

of respondent's own witness, Mairian Winn, indicates otherwise.
She testified that.the idea for the deed originated in the mind
of Trilba Jones.

(T 68, 69)

That evidence is contrary to the

position that duress:;was the cause of the deed since duress assumes the forcing of the will of Millie Colby on Trilba Jones
and not vice-versa.
The evidence apparantly produced by respondent for support
of this finding is contained in the testimony of
herself.
supra.

Mrs~

Jones,

It is subject all of the questions that are raised,
It is significant here, as there, that Mrs. Jones

repeatedly stated: "I don't know what I done."
however, on :direct

,e;xaminatidn.~-:.

CT 30)

Mrs. Jones,

did admit, as discussed, supra;

Q: And so it was your idea them to go

ahe~d

and deed the property to Millie?
A: Yes, but Millie's dead now.

(T 29)

Evidence that was, apparantly, offered as prelimary to show duress
was offered by Bonnie Shiner (T 39-47) but was objected to (T 39,
48) and ruled as inadmissible. (T 48)

As a result, the respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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did not produce evidence to support the

D.
PERSONS WITH A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO TRILBA
JONES FAILED IN THE DUTY TO INFORM HER
OF THE DEED OF MARCH 3, 1978
The court makes a finding which, in its terms, may apply,
to parties other than the appellant's predeceasor in interest,
Millie Colby.

Does this finding mean that the Notary Public

before whom Trilba Jones signed the deed in question failed to
inform her of its import?

Or that the hospital personnel, gen-

erally failed to protect her interests?

Appellant's search of

the Utah Code and decisional law fails to show such a duty.
The only "i::erson"to whom the finding could refer is Millie Colby.
The testimony of Trilba Jones was tha.t she discovered the
existence of the March 3, 1978, deed only when she attempted to
sell the subject property. (T 16)

The discussion, supra, is

replete with references to and comments on the testimony of
Trilba Jones with respect to her memory at trial of prior
events and the purposes she may have had in so testifying,and
will not be repeated here but has
argument.

parallel application to this

It is the appellant's position that Trilba Jones

did know of the deed at the time of its

execution~and

that

this finding, based on a position to the contrary, is without
basis in the evidence0when the evidence is taken as a whole.
-The law concerning confidential relationships is well established
in Utah decisional law.

In Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710

(Utah-1965), the heirs of the decedent attacked a deed granting
property which otherwise would have passed on the decedents death
wherein a non-heir received the property.

The grantee was a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wife, a party to the suit.

At 713 the Court stated:

"The evidence is undisputed that there existed
among the parties [to the deed]_ sincere affection,
trust and confidence, but is this legally sufficient
to constitute a confidential relationship giving
rise to a presumption that the transaction was
unfair? We think not.
The mere relationship of parent and child does not constitute evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a presumption of fraud or undue
influence. While ··kinshfu.p may be a factor in determining the existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, there must be a showing,
in addition to kinship, a reposal of confidence
by one party and the resulting superiority and inf 1 uence ori the other party. "
In Bradbury the Court found that no such relationship existed.
In that case, as here, there was intervention by an attorney.
Bradbu11ry:fu.t:ther stat:J.es the law as:
"The confidence must be reposed by one under such
circumstances as to create a corresponding duty
* * * and it must result in a situation where as
a··matter of fact there is superior influence on one
side and dependence on the other."id.
The appellant argued, at
established by the facts.

t~ial~

that such a relationship was not

While there was a Power of Attorney

created, the evidence fails to show that the deed in question
was executed by Millie Colby under that power.

Rather, it bears

the name of Trilba Jones and, according to testimony from both
parties' witnesses, including Trilba Jones, herself, was the idea
of Trilba Jones.

There was testimony that Millie Colby afilded

Mrs. Jones in her financial matters but the evidence discloses
only situations where checks were prepared for household expenses of Mrs. Jones but the signature thereon was always that
of Mrs. Jones.

Such is not the "substitution of the will of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one over another.
But, assuming, arguendo, that such a relationship.may be
reasonably found from the evidence, was there breach of its
duties by the superior party in the execution of the March 3,
1978, deed which should_result in its invalidity?
in Peterson v. Carter, supra, at 331, ruled:

The court,

"[Undue influence]

must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the grantee
exercised a dominating influence over the granter."

The evi-

dence preponderates to the appellant in this question.

E.
THE TRANSFER TO APPELLANT BY. MILLIE
COLBY WAS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
The appellant admitted that she was not a bona fide purchaser for value.

Appellant further, however, asserted at the

pre-trial hearing and showed in the trial that she had received
the subject property by gift from her mother, Millie Colby.
That position, per se, does not invalidate her claim so long
as the claim of Millie Colby is deuermined valid.

See Jordanv.

·Jordan, s.upra.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON .GROUNDS :r:
OF SURPISE BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MAIRIAM WINN
! ,

The re~pondent's intent to call Mairiam Winn as a witness
in her case in chief was not disclosed at the pre-trial hearing.
Her testimony
objected
on grounds
amounting
surprise
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on the raising of a new issue.

(T 69,70)

the objection and allowed the testimony.

The court overruled
After trial the ap-

pellant filed her Motion for New Trial, supported with affidavits
of her former counsel, Mr. Gary Anderson, and Clint Colby, a
witness sought to be called in rebuttal to the testimony of
Mairiam Winn..

That motion was denied by the Court.

Rules of Civil Procedure., provides that "
be granted on

* * *

* * *

Rule 99, Utah

a new trial may

all or part of the issues, for any of the

following causes; provided that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take addi tonal testimony

*

* *:

( 3) '•Accident

or surprise,. which, '.Ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."
The issue in question was the establishment of a trust or other
fiduciary relationship which was not plead in the Complaint or
established as an issue at the pre-trial hearing (Transcript of
Pre-Trial Hearing, 9) without objection from appellant. Denial
of. the Motion for New Trial, under the circumstances of the findings actually made by the Court, cannot be considered "harmless
error."

Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra, at 814.

III
THE COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING IN
THE TRIAL EVIDENCE AS TO A FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP
At pre-trial conference in this case appellant's counsel
ojected to the issue of fiduciary relationship being included
as an issue in the ti.ial.

{Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing, 9)

Further, appellant objected to the introduction of evidence in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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relation to that issue (T 69, 70)

The Court overruled both the

objection at pre-trial and at trial.

The appellant asserts this

is error since the issue in question was not framed by the pleadings and therefore not rightly before the court.

This is not

"harmless error" since the Court entered a specificifinding on
this very issue.
The law is clear that not all error is grounds for reversal,
especially in a non-jury trial.

In Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra,

at 814, the Court stated, that in non-jury trials "

* * *

the

trial judge has superior knowledge as to the competency and effect
which should be given evidence, and that he will make his findings
and decision in conformity therewith."
\, Court continued,

"

* * *

The inquiry to make, the

is whether there was

error of a suf-

ficiently substantial nature that it is reasonable to believe that
it adversly affected the appellant or deprived him of a fair trial
in such a way that in the absence of such error there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different."

id.

In .an appeal of a decison of the District Court sitting as a court
in equity, the reviewing powers of the Supreme Court are heightened

in this area.
Appellant asserts that the error was reversible ana, at least,
the case should have been reopened for rebuttal testimony.

CONCLUSION
The appellant asserts that the evidence, taken as a whole,
does not support the findings in favor of respondent made by
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versed.

In the alternative, the appellant asserts that the trial

Court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of
Mairiam Winn concerning a fiduciary relationship between the parties over the

objec~ion

of appellant's trial counsel.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi's 26th day of July, 1982.

~iWunooo~
ROBERT J. SC~CHER
Attorney f~Ap~ellant
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Provo, Utah ~l
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